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Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament:
Why the Budapest Memorandum Failed
The issue of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and the Budapest Memorandum has remained a topic of intense scrutiny and debate since its signing. Despite initial optimism surrounding the Budapest Memorandum, its shortcomings and lack of legal weight have cast a shadow of doubt over its viability. This article delves into the complexities and controversies surrounding Ukraine's nuclear disarmament efforts, examining the historical context, political implications, and the lasting consequences of the Budapest Memorandum's failure.
After the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, four independent states emerged on its territory, inheriting Soviet nuclear weapons: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Specifically, Ukraine retained tactical nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, silo-based and mobile launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as storage facilities with nuclear warheads.
After the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, four independent states emerged on its territory, inheriting Soviet nuclear weapons: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Specifically, Ukraine retained tactical nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, silo-based and mobile launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as storage facilities with nuclear warheads.
These stockpiles were the third largest in the world, surpassing those of the United Kingdom, France,
and China.
and China.
However, keeping nuclear weapons in Ukraine was futile, resource-intensive, and dangerous. Firstly, the command centers for Soviet strategic nuclear forces remained concentrated in Moscow, and the Ukrainian government did not possess the codes for launching strategic missiles. Furthermore, by 1997, the nuclear warheads were about to reach their expiration date and be returned to Russia for disposal.
Secondly, the Soviet nuclear infrastructure was extremely costly. Constructing the necessary facilities in Ukraine to produce and maintain the nuclear system in appropriate condition would have required approximately $65 billion – a significant burden for the Ukrainian government. Moreover, the system was technologically complex, involving satellites and space tracking stations, but many specialists from the Soviet missile forces had resigned and relocated to Russia after the USSR's dissolution, making it difficult to replace trained specialists.
Thirdly, as noted by Ukraine's ex-representative to the UN, Yuriy Sergeyev, the presence of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory posed a threat primarily to Ukraine itself. Military nuclear facilities could be targeted in a terrorist attack, and any system malfunction could lead to a tragedy. "We were sitting on a powder keg," recalls the diplomat.
Secondly, the Soviet nuclear infrastructure was extremely costly. Constructing the necessary facilities in Ukraine to produce and maintain the nuclear system in appropriate condition would have required approximately $65 billion – a significant burden for the Ukrainian government. Moreover, the system was technologically complex, involving satellites and space tracking stations, but many specialists from the Soviet missile forces had resigned and relocated to Russia after the USSR's dissolution, making it difficult to replace trained specialists.
Thirdly, as noted by Ukraine's ex-representative to the UN, Yuriy Sergeyev, the presence of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory posed a threat primarily to Ukraine itself. Military nuclear facilities could be targeted in a terrorist attack, and any system malfunction could lead to a tragedy. "We were sitting on a powder keg," recalls the diplomat.
According to the first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, both Ukraine and the United States were interested in Russia taking possession of the strategic nuclear weapons. Ukraine did not want to remain a target, the United States had missiles aimed at its territory, and Russia itself viewed it as a matter of strategic security.
The fate of the strategic nuclear weapons was determined after the signing of the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992 by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the United States. The protocol was an additional agreement to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and obligated Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to eliminate their nuclear weapons and join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Thus, in October 1991, Ukraine became a non-nuclear state. Although the entire Ukrainian nuclear arsenal was estimated at approximately $200 billion, the government received compensation of only about $500 million. However, more importantly, in exchange for transferring nuclear weapons to Russia, Ukraine demanded security guarantees and territorial integrity from states officially possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China). The promised guarantees were provided in the form of the Budapest Memorandum, signed on December 5, 1994.
Thus, in October 1991, Ukraine became a non-nuclear state. Although the entire Ukrainian nuclear arsenal was estimated at approximately $200 billion, the government received compensation of only about $500 million. However, more importantly, in exchange for transferring nuclear weapons to Russia, Ukraine demanded security guarantees and territorial integrity from states officially possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China). The promised guarantees were provided in the form of the Budapest Memorandum, signed on December 5, 1994.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia pledged to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and existing borders, refrain from the use of force and economic pressure, and, in the event of any threats to Ukraine involving the use of nuclear weapons, to seek immediate action from the UN Security Council.
Nevertheless, the events that began in 2014 demonstrated that the Budapest Memorandum had no practical value, partly due to its imperfections and short-sightedness. One of the reasons for the weak international response to the annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine was the lack of provisions legally binding the signatories to act in defense of Ukraine. Furthermore, the memorandum did not provide a course of action in case one of the signatories, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, became an aggressor against Ukraine.
The failure of the Budapest Memorandum has led to ironic consequences: in the current war, Russia is shelling Ukraine with its own weapons. As part of the agreement concluded between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in Yalta on October 8, 1999, heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles of the Tu-160 and Tu-95MC types were transferred to Russia.
The failure of the Budapest Memorandum has led to ironic consequences: in the current war, Russia is shelling Ukraine with its own weapons. As part of the agreement concluded between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in Yalta on October 8, 1999, heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles of the Tu-160 and Tu-95MC types were transferred to Russia.
For the record, Tu-95 (NATO reporting name: "Bear") is a Soviet strategic bomber-missile carrier, the world's fastest aircraft with turboprop engines (the Tu-95MS is the variant that can release cruise missiles). Meanwhile, Tu-160 ("Blackjack") is the largest and most powerful supersonic aircraft in the history of military aviation, as well as the heaviest combat aircraft in the world.
Interestingly, doubts about the effectiveness of the memorandum arose even at the time of its signing. For example, Leonid Kuchma, the President of Ukraine from 1994 to 2005 who signed it, stated that President François Mitterrand of France, who was present in Budapest during the signing ceremony, expressed confidence that it would not be implemented. Later, in 2013, the United States publicly stated that the Budapest Memorandum does not have binding legal force and referred to it as a "political commitment." Perhaps the most accurate and vivid description of the agreement was given by German journalist and expert on Ukraine Winfried Schneider-Deters: "The agreement is not worth the paper it's written on."
Former and current political representatives of Ukraine have repeatedly expressed disappointment and regret over the signing of the memorandum. For example, the aforementioned Leonid Kuchma, in an interview with Radio Free Europe, called the agreement one of the three main mistakes made by the Ukrainian authorities during the years of the country's independence (alongside the neglect of the energy sector and the governance of Yanukovych). President Volodymyr Zelensky, in turn, threatened to declare the Budapest Memorandum and the agreement on nuclear disarmament invalid if specific decisions on security guarantees for Ukraine are not made at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, 2022. As we know, his appeal became irrelevant within 5 days. The Budapest Memorandum has definitely failed, and the consequences of nullifying the agreement on nuclear disarmament will become clear in the near future.
Former and current political representatives of Ukraine have repeatedly expressed disappointment and regret over the signing of the memorandum. For example, the aforementioned Leonid Kuchma, in an interview with Radio Free Europe, called the agreement one of the three main mistakes made by the Ukrainian authorities during the years of the country's independence (alongside the neglect of the energy sector and the governance of Yanukovych). President Volodymyr Zelensky, in turn, threatened to declare the Budapest Memorandum and the agreement on nuclear disarmament invalid if specific decisions on security guarantees for Ukraine are not made at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, 2022. As we know, his appeal became irrelevant within 5 days. The Budapest Memorandum has definitely failed, and the consequences of nullifying the agreement on nuclear disarmament will become clear in the near future.
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