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Not My Brother Anymore:
Is There a Chance for a Dialogue
with the 'Good' Russians?
The refusal of Ukrainians to engage in any form of cooperation with Russians, including those who hold anti-war views, is a unique phenomenon with no direct parallels in modern history. The destructive aggression of Russia and the protracted war have eroded trust in the rationality of Russians, regardless of their stance and level of involvement in the conflict. Nevertheless, over time, this perspective has begun to shift, and today, discussions have already started in Ukraine about the possibility of collaboration with Russians who hold anti-war sentiments.
Throughout the armed conflict in Ukraine, Ukrainian national identity has become a significant aspect of self-identification. Kremlin's propaganda efforts, aimed at denying the existence of a Ukrainian nation, have led to a reciprocal rejection of "Russian" and "Russians" regardless of their political beliefs and views on the war among various segments of Russian society.
However, despite the enemy image being created, it is impossible to ignore the millions of Russians who oppose the conflict. The question of resources for victory and the future development of Ukraine leaves room for assessing the feasibility of interaction with "right," anti-war Russians. Is it possible? And how do Ukrainians perceive this possibility?
Throughout the armed conflict in Ukraine, Ukrainian national identity has become a significant aspect of self-identification. Kremlin's propaganda efforts, aimed at denying the existence of a Ukrainian nation, have led to a reciprocal rejection of "Russian" and "Russians" regardless of their political beliefs and views on the war among various segments of Russian society.
However, despite the enemy image being created, it is impossible to ignore the millions of Russians who oppose the conflict. The question of resources for victory and the future development of Ukraine leaves room for assessing the feasibility of interaction with "right," anti-war Russians. Is it possible? And how do Ukrainians perceive this possibility?
Who is to blame for the war?
ExtremeScan conducted a survey among Ukrainians in November 2022 and July 2023 to find out what they think not about 'forgiving' Russians but about the possibility of pragmatic interaction with the anti-war segment of Russian society.
First and foremost, the majority of respondents believe that the responsibility for the war lies with the entire Russian people. However, significant differences exist between residents of different regions of Ukraine and those who chose Ukrainian (82% of those surveyed in July) or Russian (14% of those surveyed) as their language for the interview.
It is important to note that among Ukrainian-speaking and Western residents, there are about 30% who are willing to acknowledge that Russians who do not support the war are not responsible for it. On the other hand, about 50% of Eastern Ukrainians and 35% of Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine blame the entire Russian people for the war.
First and foremost, the majority of respondents believe that the responsibility for the war lies with the entire Russian people. However, significant differences exist between residents of different regions of Ukraine and those who chose Ukrainian (82% of those surveyed in July) or Russian (14% of those surveyed) as their language for the interview.
It is important to note that among Ukrainian-speaking and Western residents, there are about 30% who are willing to acknowledge that Russians who do not support the war are not responsible for it. On the other hand, about 50% of Eastern Ukrainians and 35% of Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine blame the entire Russian people for the war.
Thirty years of post-Soviet research had shown a remarkable imbalance: Ukrainians had, for a long time, held a better view of Russians than Russians had of them. The situation began to change in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and Russia's invasion of Donbass, but even then, Ukrainians displayed patience. However, a survey conducted in November 2022 revealed a pronounced shift in this paradigm.
Ukrainians have a justifiable tendency to express their discontent with the population of the aggressor country. By the end of 2022, 42% of Ukrainians had ceased communication with their relatives in Russia, with only about a quarter continuing such communication. Sixty percent of Ukrainians criticized Russians for their inaction, and even more, 70%, condemned Russians who had left the country because they believed that it was the Russian people who should stand up against Putin's regime. Ukrainians had hoped for assistance and internal resistance from Russians to be directed against the regime in order to end the war. However, this did not occur. As a result, Ukrainians lost faith in the possibility of positive changes in Russia: 32% do not expect a shift in the political course even after Putin's death, and 34% are convinced that only Ukraine's victory can lead to such a change.
Ukrainians have a justifiable tendency to express their discontent with the population of the aggressor country. By the end of 2022, 42% of Ukrainians had ceased communication with their relatives in Russia, with only about a quarter continuing such communication. Sixty percent of Ukrainians criticized Russians for their inaction, and even more, 70%, condemned Russians who had left the country because they believed that it was the Russian people who should stand up against Putin's regime. Ukrainians had hoped for assistance and internal resistance from Russians to be directed against the regime in order to end the war. However, this did not occur. As a result, Ukrainians lost faith in the possibility of positive changes in Russia: 32% do not expect a shift in the political course even after Putin's death, and 34% are convinced that only Ukraine's victory can lead to such a change.
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New opinion
In responses to the question about the possibility of negotiations with a hypothetical new government in Russia in November 2022, opponents of dialogue were in the majority, but the situation has since turned around. The indicator of the feasibility of dialogue with the new government has grown from 39% to 52% over the course of seven months. Eastern regions demonstrated a higher level of readiness for cooperation, as compared to western regions (63% versus 47%, respectively). At the same time, western Ukraine showed a greater willingness to cooperate with 'anti-Putin' Russia.
According to the research, the willingness to engage in dialogue is linked to the fundamental belief about who is responsible for the war. Those who solely blame militaristic groups in power and society are more willing to consider contact with the new government (66%) than those who hold the view of all Russians bearing responsibility (in this case, only 46% are open to dialogue).
Even more notable is the shift in support for cooperation with the civilian population of Russia in the context of countering the war. The proportion of those who consider such cooperation as correct has increased from 49% to 67% from November to July. The 'post-Soviet' generation, which includes respondents under 40, is less enthusiastic about cooperation compared to those over 50. Young Ukrainians are not burdened by the experience of living with Russians. Women, on the other hand, are significantly less tolerant. As practice and research data show, they perceive the war much more acutely and emotionally and are more resolute in rejecting its 'source'.
According to the research, the willingness to engage in dialogue is linked to the fundamental belief about who is responsible for the war. Those who solely blame militaristic groups in power and society are more willing to consider contact with the new government (66%) than those who hold the view of all Russians bearing responsibility (in this case, only 46% are open to dialogue).
Even more notable is the shift in support for cooperation with the civilian population of Russia in the context of countering the war. The proportion of those who consider such cooperation as correct has increased from 49% to 67% from November to July. The 'post-Soviet' generation, which includes respondents under 40, is less enthusiastic about cooperation compared to those over 50. Young Ukrainians are not burdened by the experience of living with Russians. Women, on the other hand, are significantly less tolerant. As practice and research data show, they perceive the war much more acutely and emotionally and are more resolute in rejecting its 'source'.
Moreover, the willingness to cooperate with the Russian people against the war has increased by 20% among the Ukrainian-speaking audience, from 46% in November to 66% in July. Among the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, the changes are not as radical, with willingness increasing from 67% to 75%. In western Ukraine, this figure rose from 38% to 61%, and in eastern Ukraine, from 62% to 73%. It appears that the differences in attitudes along the 'West-East' and 'Ukrainian language-Russian language' axes will be one of the main issues on the political stage in post-war Ukraine, largely determining competing political platforms.
Nevertheless, supporters of all ideologies and groups in Ukrainian society are ready to engage with ordinary Russians in anti-war activities, setting the current situation apart from what was observed last year.
Factors of influence
The data from this research do not allow for a definitive statement about the factors influencing the change in attitudes towards cooperation with 'anti-war' Russia and increased tolerance towards Russians expressing anti-war views. This shift has been observed in all population groups, and even more strongly among those who were less inclined to such cooperation.
Surprisingly, even the tragic consequences of the war, such as forced displacement, hunger, life under occupation, and the loss of loved ones, do not seem to significantly influence the level of tolerance towards Russians expressing anti-war views. Ukrainian sociological research shows that these events have eroded the friendly attitude towards Russian citizens, but have little impact on the tolerance towards 'anti-war' Russians. The difference in responses between those who have experienced more significant hardships and those who have experienced them to a lesser extent is only about 10 percentage points. Meanwhile, differences related to geographic location (West-East), language, and political orientations appear to be more significant. These responses likely reflect a more pragmatic, rather than morally evaluative perception.
It is possible that the increase in tolerance towards Russians is the result of a certain emotional adaptation to the war, which has replaced the initial shock. Overall, the inclination towards negotiations is to a small extent influenced by political, economic, and military optimism. The more optimistic Ukrainians are about the future, the less willing they are to cooperate with Russia, and vice versa. War fatigue leads to greater readiness for cooperation with the 'opponents of the war' on the other side, further supporting the assertion of a more rational approach by Ukrainians to matters of war and peace.
In any case, the issue of accepting or rejecting 'right' and 'anti-war' Russians will certainly gain significance in Ukrainian politics. Political parties and movements are compelled to find ways to appeal to voters by addressing their emotions, and this issue will be actively debated. Specializing in hunting 'Russian witches' may impact the choice of various electoral groups. However, according to the ExtremeScan study, at this moment, 'pragmatic tolerance' is the prevailing trend. Currently, Ukrainians have reached a relative consensus regarding the acceptability of cooperating with Russians expressing anti-war views. At the same time, the idea of cooperation with a hypothetical Russian 'anti-war' government has been supported by only a tentative majority (52%), which has developed in recent months. Depending on future events, these numbers will change, but for now, it can be said that there is room for rational interaction.
Surprisingly, even the tragic consequences of the war, such as forced displacement, hunger, life under occupation, and the loss of loved ones, do not seem to significantly influence the level of tolerance towards Russians expressing anti-war views. Ukrainian sociological research shows that these events have eroded the friendly attitude towards Russian citizens, but have little impact on the tolerance towards 'anti-war' Russians. The difference in responses between those who have experienced more significant hardships and those who have experienced them to a lesser extent is only about 10 percentage points. Meanwhile, differences related to geographic location (West-East), language, and political orientations appear to be more significant. These responses likely reflect a more pragmatic, rather than morally evaluative perception.
It is possible that the increase in tolerance towards Russians is the result of a certain emotional adaptation to the war, which has replaced the initial shock. Overall, the inclination towards negotiations is to a small extent influenced by political, economic, and military optimism. The more optimistic Ukrainians are about the future, the less willing they are to cooperate with Russia, and vice versa. War fatigue leads to greater readiness for cooperation with the 'opponents of the war' on the other side, further supporting the assertion of a more rational approach by Ukrainians to matters of war and peace.
In any case, the issue of accepting or rejecting 'right' and 'anti-war' Russians will certainly gain significance in Ukrainian politics. Political parties and movements are compelled to find ways to appeal to voters by addressing their emotions, and this issue will be actively debated. Specializing in hunting 'Russian witches' may impact the choice of various electoral groups. However, according to the ExtremeScan study, at this moment, 'pragmatic tolerance' is the prevailing trend. Currently, Ukrainians have reached a relative consensus regarding the acceptability of cooperating with Russians expressing anti-war views. At the same time, the idea of cooperation with a hypothetical Russian 'anti-war' government has been supported by only a tentative majority (52%), which has developed in recent months. Depending on future events, these numbers will change, but for now, it can be said that there is room for rational interaction.
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