Nevertheless, at the end of the year we saw a surge in anxiety about inflation, the main symbol of which was
the rise in prices for eggs and, to a lesser extent,
for bananas, the most popular fruit in the Russian grocery basket. Recall, however, that respondents generally had a positive view of 2023, considering it a "rather successful" year.
Political LandscapeThroughout 2023, there were high levels of support for key state institutions and the government. These sentiments were driven by last year's consolidation of public opinion around the government and patriotic fervor against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which the majority of the country's population sees as forced on Russia by the West. This trend is very similar to the so-called "Crimea effect" – when widespread support for the regime was observed for several years after the first stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict back in 2014. Even after Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion and the introduction of undemocratic prohibitions, the majority of the population did not change its attitude toward the government.
Support for Putin also remains high, and his decision to run for another term was met positively. Surveys show that the majority is ready to support him in the coming election, which underlines the stability of his political popularity. As of November, the number of Russians who want to see Putin back in the Kremlin was 78%, up from 72% a year earlier.
However, the high levels of political support do not guarantee unanimous support for every decision of the authorities. Thus, the recent
initiatives that would seriously limit women's access to abortions sparked outrage and did not receive broad support.
This indicates that people are ready to support the government on many issues – but only as long as it does not diverge from their vital interests and values. This is also true when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Sustained high levels of support for the "special operation" are possible only on the condition that the majority of Russians are not required to actively take part in it – which includes expressing an opinion on it. Otherwise – as was the case during the partial mobilization – feelings of anxiety
rise sharply, people start demanding that the conflict be wrapped up and approval ratings begin to decline.
Apparently in a nod to this, in 2023 the authorities sought to avoid unpopular decisions and took the path of recruiting volunteers for the conflict, thereby ensuring social stability. The failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive also played a role, as it had previously worried up to 70% of Russians. Therefore, confidence that the conflict was going well for Russia began to grow late in the year. Still, concerns about shelling of the Russian border and attacks by Ukrainian drones have not gone away. This seems to be why the first signs of fatigue from the long "special operation" became noticeable at the end of 2023. From May to November, the share of Russians in favor of peace talks increased from 45% to 57%. Still, despite all the fatigue, the majority of Russians believe that "the government knows best" when to end the "special operation" and are convinced that the "special operation" will last a long time.
Thus, the "boiling point" seems to still be a ways off.