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Public Sentiments in Ukraine and Russia: Expected Worries and
Unforeseen Resemblances
In 2023, sociological research conducted in Russia and Ukraine provided a unique opportunity to closely examine popular views on the current situation. Economic conditions, the political landscape and individual outlooks on the future were the primary focus of surveys conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Ukraine and the Levada Center in Russia in December. This overview aims to compare sentiment in Ukrainian and Russian societies, providing insights into how different aspects of life are perceived in these two countries.
View from Ukraine: Optimism and Faith in the Future
General Sentiment
Ukrainian society is rather optimistic about the current state of affairs. According to the study, Ukrainians view both their personal future (55%) and the future of Ukraine (61%) with hope. Besides hope, anxiety was the feeling most mentioned (by 37% of respondents), though optimism and confidence prevail among 30% and 17% of the population, respectively.
The impact of the war is felt by an overwhelming majority of the population (95%), with 61% considering its impact critical. While these assessments are widespread across all macro-regions of Ukraine, the eastern region feels the war the most, as 68% of the population there claims that the war radically affects their daily lives. Notably, the war manifests itself in all people's lives regardless of age. Among the youth (18-29 years old), the percentage of those who believe the war strongly affects them is lower than in other age groups, but even among them such views are in the majority (54%).
Ukrainian society is rather optimistic about the current state of affairs. According to the study, Ukrainians view both their personal future (55%) and the future of Ukraine (61%) with hope. Besides hope, anxiety was the feeling most mentioned (by 37% of respondents), though optimism and confidence prevail among 30% and 17% of the population, respectively.
The impact of the war is felt by an overwhelming majority of the population (95%), with 61% considering its impact critical. While these assessments are widespread across all macro-regions of Ukraine, the eastern region feels the war the most, as 68% of the population there claims that the war radically affects their daily lives. Notably, the war manifests itself in all people's lives regardless of age. Among the youth (18-29 years old), the percentage of those who believe the war strongly affects them is lower than in other age groups, but even among them such views are in the majority (54%).
Importantly, confidence in victory in the war continues to unite the vast majority of Ukrainians (88%), with 63% expressing unwavering belief. Only 5% of respondents express doubts about the possibility of victory.
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation
More than half of Ukrainians (58%) believe that Ukraine will achieve victory in the short term: 6% in the next few months, 21% by the summer of 2024 and another 31% within 1-2 years.
Of particular interest are Ukrainians' views regarding what victory would look like. It turns out that simply defeating the enemy is not sufficient for most Ukrainians. The leading expectation in this regard is the release of all prisoners and the return of deported (to Russia) compatriots (69%). The second-most given answer is Ukraine's accession to NATO for a guarantee against new wars (42%), along with punishment of all Russian war criminals (42%) and compensation for all damages to Ukraine's economy and citizens (41.5%). Additionally, one in four Ukrainians (26%) would consider the dissolution of Russia as a state a marker of victory. However, there are significant regional variations on this response. In the west, 40% mentioned it, while in central and eastern Ukraine, the figure was 23% and 24%, respectively. In the south, only 10% would see Russia breaking up as success. There, the absolute priority, expressed by 80% of respondents, is the release of all prisoners and the return of deported Ukrainians.
Notably, Ukrainians do not just talk about an imminent victory over Russia. According to the study, 63% have personally contributed funds to volunteers and charitable organizations supporting the Ukrainian army in the last 12 months. Half of the respondents (51%) also assisted internally displaced persons with money, clothing, food or other items. One in four Ukrainians (26%) participated in equipping the Ukrainian army by weaving nets, repairing equipment or 3D-printing drone parts, for example. Another 23% participated in various charitable actions supporting the Ukrainian army and those affected by the war, and 13% were directly involved in volunteer work, providing medical assistance and support to Ukrainian army soldiers in the last 12 months. All these facts indicate active involvement of the Ukrainian civilian population in defending and aiding the country during wartime.
Foreign Policy through the Lens of Public Opinion
As for neighboring states, Poland stands out as the one that Ukrainians most positively view. For 66% of Ukrainians, Poland evokes a positive attitude, while only 8% express negative sentiments. Twenty-two percent of citizens, meanwhile, maintain a neutral position. Moreover, every second Ukrainian (51%) believes that the Polish population has a positive attitude toward Ukraine, while 13% claim that Poles dislike them.
Bringing up the year, Belarus is the least liked among Ukraine's neighbors (excluding Russia). Currently, 78% of Ukrainians have a negative view of Belarus. Only 12% express a neutral position (the lowest level seen) and less than 5% of Ukrainians positively view Belarus. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainians believe that the Belarusian population also has a negative attitude toward Ukraine (61%). Only 7% of respondents believe that Belarusians are favorably disposed toward Ukrainians.
Of particular interest are Ukrainians' views regarding what victory would look like. It turns out that simply defeating the enemy is not sufficient for most Ukrainians. The leading expectation in this regard is the release of all prisoners and the return of deported (to Russia) compatriots (69%). The second-most given answer is Ukraine's accession to NATO for a guarantee against new wars (42%), along with punishment of all Russian war criminals (42%) and compensation for all damages to Ukraine's economy and citizens (41.5%). Additionally, one in four Ukrainians (26%) would consider the dissolution of Russia as a state a marker of victory. However, there are significant regional variations on this response. In the west, 40% mentioned it, while in central and eastern Ukraine, the figure was 23% and 24%, respectively. In the south, only 10% would see Russia breaking up as success. There, the absolute priority, expressed by 80% of respondents, is the release of all prisoners and the return of deported Ukrainians.
Notably, Ukrainians do not just talk about an imminent victory over Russia. According to the study, 63% have personally contributed funds to volunteers and charitable organizations supporting the Ukrainian army in the last 12 months. Half of the respondents (51%) also assisted internally displaced persons with money, clothing, food or other items. One in four Ukrainians (26%) participated in equipping the Ukrainian army by weaving nets, repairing equipment or 3D-printing drone parts, for example. Another 23% participated in various charitable actions supporting the Ukrainian army and those affected by the war, and 13% were directly involved in volunteer work, providing medical assistance and support to Ukrainian army soldiers in the last 12 months. All these facts indicate active involvement of the Ukrainian civilian population in defending and aiding the country during wartime.
Foreign Policy through the Lens of Public Opinion
As for neighboring states, Poland stands out as the one that Ukrainians most positively view. For 66% of Ukrainians, Poland evokes a positive attitude, while only 8% express negative sentiments. Twenty-two percent of citizens, meanwhile, maintain a neutral position. Moreover, every second Ukrainian (51%) believes that the Polish population has a positive attitude toward Ukraine, while 13% claim that Poles dislike them.
Bringing up the year, Belarus is the least liked among Ukraine's neighbors (excluding Russia). Currently, 78% of Ukrainians have a negative view of Belarus. Only 12% express a neutral position (the lowest level seen) and less than 5% of Ukrainians positively view Belarus. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainians believe that the Belarusian population also has a negative attitude toward Ukraine (61%). Only 7% of respondents believe that Belarusians are favorably disposed toward Ukrainians.
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation
Assessing the conflict in the Middle East, the majority of Ukrainians (66%) see Hamas as the aggressor, while only 5.5% point to Israel. Twenty-three percent of respondents do not have a formed opinion on who the aggressor is.
Assessment of the Country's Situation
Interestingly, after the onset of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the percentage of citizens believing that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction significantly increased (from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in September-October 2022, reaching the highest levels in February-March 2023 at 61%). Subsequently, there has been a trend downward: with positive assessments dropping 45% according to the latest survey, while 33% of respondents believe that things in the country are headed in the wrong direction, with 21.5% undecided. Still, 78% of Ukrainians are confident that the country can overcome its current challenges.
Assessment of the Country's Situation
Interestingly, after the onset of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the percentage of citizens believing that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction significantly increased (from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in September-October 2022, reaching the highest levels in February-March 2023 at 61%). Subsequently, there has been a trend downward: with positive assessments dropping 45% according to the latest survey, while 33% of respondents believe that things in the country are headed in the wrong direction, with 21.5% undecided. Still, 78% of Ukrainians are confident that the country can overcome its current challenges.
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation
Note that Ukrainians express strong skepticism about the economic situation in the country. In May 2021, 60% of respondents considered it "very bad" or "fairly bad," a figure that increased to 64.5% in September-October 2022. Assessments improved in February-March 2023, but by December 2023, the figures had fallen again to 66.5%. That said, the well-being of households is generally rated higher than the overall economic situation in the country. Most respondents (81%) have enough funds to purchase food and necessary items. However, since the onset of the war, this indicator has continued to decline.
From 2021 to the end of 2023, expectations about changes in the economy and household well-being fluctuated. Nevertheless, overall pessimism persists, with substantial growth recorded only in medium-term expectations for an improvement.
From 2021 to the end of 2023, expectations about changes in the economy and household well-being fluctuated. Nevertheless, overall pessimism persists, with substantial growth recorded only in medium-term expectations for an improvement.
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation
Another significant aspect of the study was gauging public trust in prominent political figures and societal institutions. According to the survey, the Armed Forces of Ukraine enjoy the highest trust (94%). The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians also trust volunteer battalions (89%), volunteer organizations (86%), the State Emergency Service (83%), the National Guard (82%), the Ministry of Defense (73%), the State Border Guard Service (72%), the Security Service (71%) and the president (71%).
Most respondents express distrust in political parties (76% do not trust them), bureaucrats (73%), the judicial system (72%), the Verkhovna Rada (66%), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (52%), the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (51%) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (51%).
Most respondents express distrust in political parties (76% do not trust them), bureaucrats (73%), the judicial system (72%), the Verkhovna Rada (66%), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (52%), the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (51%) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (51%).
This shows that almost all Ukrainians count on the army and the military leadership of the country, but do not trust the government and especially the current anti-corruption apparatus.
View from Russia: Accelerated Adaptation
General Sentiment
According to surveys, 2023 turned out to be a considerably better year for Russians than 2022. Salary and pension indexation, as well as payments to soldiers fighting in the "special operation," contributed to the perceived improvement in the situation. Even Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion could not shake the consolidation of Russians behind the Kremlin. However, this also does not mean unanimous support for all decisions, as the percentage of supporters of peace negotiations is constantly growing.
Note that 2022 was perceived by Russians as not so difficult, despite the "special operation," Western sanctions and the shock of mobilization. The majority of respondents, meanwhile, saw 2023 as "average" or even "good," with two thirds saying it was "rather successful," which is the highest indicator since 2000. As respondents explained, they had time to relax, some came into money, some found a new job and even took up personal development. Still, Russians again said that the year turned out harder for the country than for themselves personally.
In the eyes of Russians, the main events of the year were rising prices, Vladimir Putin's announcement of another presidential run, the "special operation," the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the school shooting in Bryansk, Putin's annual call-in show, the earthquake in Turkey, rising salaries and pensions, the march on Moscow by Wagner and the subsequent death of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Still, surveys reflect a quick return to normality and adaptation to ongoing events.
Economic Trends of 2023
Throughout 2023, there was a steady trend of improving economic assessments, as recorded by indexes of consumer and social sentiment. This trend began to emerge in the summer of 2022 as the March inflation shock wore off: in the year and a half since then, the number of people reporting a worsening of their economic situation decreased, as did the share of those who expect their situation to worsen in the future.
Expedited indexation [adjusting for inflation] of wages and pensions played a key role in positive assessments of the economic situation, as did payments for those fighting in the "special operation," as they are several times higher than the monthly income of most Russians. Moreover, there has been a noticeable increase in the share of people who, in their own estimation, can afford to buy relatively expensive items, such as a TV or refrigerator. The less well-off segments of the population are most susceptible to the government measures, with their outlook immediately improving following the decisions. In general, they are adapting to the situation with slightly greater ease – their demands are more modest, they respond more positively to government support measures and their way of life has changed little because of the sanctions, which largely hit the richer and more Westernized parts of major Russian cities.
According to surveys, 2023 turned out to be a considerably better year for Russians than 2022. Salary and pension indexation, as well as payments to soldiers fighting in the "special operation," contributed to the perceived improvement in the situation. Even Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion could not shake the consolidation of Russians behind the Kremlin. However, this also does not mean unanimous support for all decisions, as the percentage of supporters of peace negotiations is constantly growing.
Note that 2022 was perceived by Russians as not so difficult, despite the "special operation," Western sanctions and the shock of mobilization. The majority of respondents, meanwhile, saw 2023 as "average" or even "good," with two thirds saying it was "rather successful," which is the highest indicator since 2000. As respondents explained, they had time to relax, some came into money, some found a new job and even took up personal development. Still, Russians again said that the year turned out harder for the country than for themselves personally.
In the eyes of Russians, the main events of the year were rising prices, Vladimir Putin's announcement of another presidential run, the "special operation," the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the school shooting in Bryansk, Putin's annual call-in show, the earthquake in Turkey, rising salaries and pensions, the march on Moscow by Wagner and the subsequent death of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Still, surveys reflect a quick return to normality and adaptation to ongoing events.
Economic Trends of 2023
Throughout 2023, there was a steady trend of improving economic assessments, as recorded by indexes of consumer and social sentiment. This trend began to emerge in the summer of 2022 as the March inflation shock wore off: in the year and a half since then, the number of people reporting a worsening of their economic situation decreased, as did the share of those who expect their situation to worsen in the future.
Expedited indexation [adjusting for inflation] of wages and pensions played a key role in positive assessments of the economic situation, as did payments for those fighting in the "special operation," as they are several times higher than the monthly income of most Russians. Moreover, there has been a noticeable increase in the share of people who, in their own estimation, can afford to buy relatively expensive items, such as a TV or refrigerator. The less well-off segments of the population are most susceptible to the government measures, with their outlook immediately improving following the decisions. In general, they are adapting to the situation with slightly greater ease – their demands are more modest, they respond more positively to government support measures and their way of life has changed little because of the sanctions, which largely hit the richer and more Westernized parts of major Russian cities.
In general, the population quickly adapted to rising prices, as people perceive inflation as a chronic problem.
Nevertheless, at the end of the year we saw a surge in anxiety about inflation, the main symbol of which was the rise in prices for eggs and, to a lesser extent, for bananas, the most popular fruit in the Russian grocery basket. Recall, however, that respondents generally had a positive view of 2023, considering it a "rather successful" year.
Political Landscape
Throughout 2023, there were high levels of support for key state institutions and the government. These sentiments were driven by last year's consolidation of public opinion around the government and patriotic fervor against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which the majority of the country's population sees as forced on Russia by the West. This trend is very similar to the so-called "Crimea effect" – when widespread support for the regime was observed for several years after the first stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict back in 2014. Even after Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion and the introduction of undemocratic prohibitions, the majority of the population did not change its attitude toward the government.
Support for Putin also remains high, and his decision to run for another term was met positively. Surveys show that the majority is ready to support him in the coming election, which underlines the stability of his political popularity. As of November, the number of Russians who want to see Putin back in the Kremlin was 78%, up from 72% a year earlier.
However, the high levels of political support do not guarantee unanimous support for every decision of the authorities. Thus, the recent initiatives that would seriously limit women's access to abortions sparked outrage and did not receive broad support. This indicates that people are ready to support the government on many issues – but only as long as it does not diverge from their vital interests and values.
This is also true when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Sustained high levels of support for the "special operation" are possible only on the condition that the majority of Russians are not required to actively take part in it – which includes expressing an opinion on it. Otherwise – as was the case during the partial mobilization – feelings of anxiety rise sharply, people start demanding that the conflict be wrapped up and approval ratings begin to decline.
Apparently in a nod to this, in 2023 the authorities sought to avoid unpopular decisions and took the path of recruiting volunteers for the conflict, thereby ensuring social stability. The failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive also played a role, as it had previously worried up to 70% of Russians. Therefore, confidence that the conflict was going well for Russia began to grow late in the year. Still, concerns about shelling of the Russian border and attacks by Ukrainian drones have not gone away. This seems to be why the first signs of fatigue from the long "special operation" became noticeable at the end of 2023. From May to November, the share of Russians in favor of peace talks increased from 45% to 57%. Still, despite all the fatigue, the majority of Russians believe that "the government knows best" when to end the "special operation" and are convinced that the "special operation" will last a long time. Thus, the "boiling point" seems to still be a ways off.
Political Landscape
Throughout 2023, there were high levels of support for key state institutions and the government. These sentiments were driven by last year's consolidation of public opinion around the government and patriotic fervor against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which the majority of the country's population sees as forced on Russia by the West. This trend is very similar to the so-called "Crimea effect" – when widespread support for the regime was observed for several years after the first stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict back in 2014. Even after Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion and the introduction of undemocratic prohibitions, the majority of the population did not change its attitude toward the government.
Support for Putin also remains high, and his decision to run for another term was met positively. Surveys show that the majority is ready to support him in the coming election, which underlines the stability of his political popularity. As of November, the number of Russians who want to see Putin back in the Kremlin was 78%, up from 72% a year earlier.
However, the high levels of political support do not guarantee unanimous support for every decision of the authorities. Thus, the recent initiatives that would seriously limit women's access to abortions sparked outrage and did not receive broad support. This indicates that people are ready to support the government on many issues – but only as long as it does not diverge from their vital interests and values.
This is also true when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Sustained high levels of support for the "special operation" are possible only on the condition that the majority of Russians are not required to actively take part in it – which includes expressing an opinion on it. Otherwise – as was the case during the partial mobilization – feelings of anxiety rise sharply, people start demanding that the conflict be wrapped up and approval ratings begin to decline.
Apparently in a nod to this, in 2023 the authorities sought to avoid unpopular decisions and took the path of recruiting volunteers for the conflict, thereby ensuring social stability. The failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive also played a role, as it had previously worried up to 70% of Russians. Therefore, confidence that the conflict was going well for Russia began to grow late in the year. Still, concerns about shelling of the Russian border and attacks by Ukrainian drones have not gone away. This seems to be why the first signs of fatigue from the long "special operation" became noticeable at the end of 2023. From May to November, the share of Russians in favor of peace talks increased from 45% to 57%. Still, despite all the fatigue, the majority of Russians believe that "the government knows best" when to end the "special operation" and are convinced that the "special operation" will last a long time. Thus, the "boiling point" seems to still be a ways off.
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Comparative Analysis
In comparing the two countries, it is evident that both populations have largely adapted to the complex circumstances. Both countries are facing challenges such as war, economic difficulties and sociocultural changes, yet citizens are exhibiting flexibility and the ability to quickly adapt to the new reality.
In Ukraine, people show a high level of optimism and faith in the future. The optimism is focused on both their personal prospects and those of the country as a whole. Despite the impact of the war on everyday life and the corresponding emotions, Ukrainians express confidence in victory and can articulate expectations about what victory would look like.
In Russia, there is also adaptation to the situation, which is evident in positive views on 2023 and economic trends. Perceived improvement in the economic situation, amid salary and pension indexation in particular, is driving broader positive sentiment.
Notably, the populations of both countries support their leaders. However, both Ukraine and Russia face domestic challenges, the most critical being economic difficulties and general anxiety caused by the war. Interestingly, though the level of support for the government is high in both countries, the population is ambivalent in its loyalty. In Russia, this is expressed in widespread criticism of controversial government decisions, such as proposed bans on abortion or mass mobilization. In Ukraine, there is a clear divide between state institutions that people count on (the army, military authorities) and those viewed with skepticism (the anti-corruption bureaucracy).
Note that the populations of both countries look confidently toward the future. In Ukraine, more than half of those surveyed harbor hope for the better, while in Russia, three quarters do so. This hope is likely fueled by a conscious or implicit belief in the authorities and in the government's ability to eventually resolve the crisis and create conditions for a happy, peaceful life. Considering the aforementioned support for the authorities, it is unlikely that the current regimes can be challenged and overthrown from within.
Thus, despite the differences in the political, economic and sociocultural contexts, both Ukraine and Russia have demonstrated their population's ability to quickly adapt to changing conditions and readiness to express optimism about the future.
In Ukraine, people show a high level of optimism and faith in the future. The optimism is focused on both their personal prospects and those of the country as a whole. Despite the impact of the war on everyday life and the corresponding emotions, Ukrainians express confidence in victory and can articulate expectations about what victory would look like.
In Russia, there is also adaptation to the situation, which is evident in positive views on 2023 and economic trends. Perceived improvement in the economic situation, amid salary and pension indexation in particular, is driving broader positive sentiment.
Notably, the populations of both countries support their leaders. However, both Ukraine and Russia face domestic challenges, the most critical being economic difficulties and general anxiety caused by the war. Interestingly, though the level of support for the government is high in both countries, the population is ambivalent in its loyalty. In Russia, this is expressed in widespread criticism of controversial government decisions, such as proposed bans on abortion or mass mobilization. In Ukraine, there is a clear divide between state institutions that people count on (the army, military authorities) and those viewed with skepticism (the anti-corruption bureaucracy).
Note that the populations of both countries look confidently toward the future. In Ukraine, more than half of those surveyed harbor hope for the better, while in Russia, three quarters do so. This hope is likely fueled by a conscious or implicit belief in the authorities and in the government's ability to eventually resolve the crisis and create conditions for a happy, peaceful life. Considering the aforementioned support for the authorities, it is unlikely that the current regimes can be challenged and overthrown from within.
Thus, despite the differences in the political, economic and sociocultural contexts, both Ukraine and Russia have demonstrated their population's ability to quickly adapt to changing conditions and readiness to express optimism about the future.
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