There is a widespread belief that Vladimir Putin seeks to build an empire. However, his actual policy seems to contradict the goals of imperialism.
There are two conditions for imperial expansion:
1) It can accommodate more than one culture;
2) It offers a civilization with global aspirations.
Thus, the imperial idea is an idea for all mankind. Putin's project of the "Russian world" is extremely anti-imperial. Putin seems to be building something similar to Muscovy – a nation-state with national outskirts and a monoculture and, most importantly, without a supra-imperial idea. After all, what is essential for an empire is an idea that is stronger and more important than the state itself. If there is no idea, there is, in essence, no empire – even if there is an emperor.
A Russian empire without Ukraine is impossible, as the roots of the Russian myth go back to Kyiv, while Ukrainians have always been deeply involved in the construction of the empire. The very idea of the Russian Empire was invented for Peter the Great by the archbishop and politician Feofan Prokopovich, who was a native of Kyiv. This idea was not new at all: many in Europe had sought to recreate the Roman Empire, and Prokopovich, a proponent of an Orthodox state and an imperialist, suggested that Peter finally realize that vision. The proposal was met with skepticism, as the question arose on what basis the new empire could expand its borders. In Ukraine, Muscovy and Europe, everyone knew perfectly well that only two dynasties historically had the right to the lands of Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland: the Gediminids and the Ruriks, who bore no relation to the Romanovs. Prokopovich brushed aside this objection, arguing that empire is metaphysical, ontological – its basis being the idea and not the right of blood, as in the case of tsars and kings.
It took three years to convince Peter, after which "the biggest theft in history" took place – the equation of Muscovy with Rus'. It is this moment when the era of Moscow imperialism begins, one of the leitmotifs of which is the Ukrainian question. The reason is simple: people remembered that Rus' is Ukraine. Moscow, as it were, stole the "brand," setting up an eternal conflict with the "brand holder." In a sense, this is the birth trauma of the Russian Empire, as normally an empire does not need someone to disappear.
Arestovich says that the only empire he knows that suppressed national identity was the Russian Empire, and it was in relation to Ukrainian identity. It was like keeping down a competitor. Thus, the calls by some people in Ukraine to follow the example of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and get rid of everything "Russian" (Russkoye, not Rossiiskoye) so that Moscow will leave Kyiv alone border on "a serious pathology" and reflect losing a "grip on reality," as neither Lithuania, nor Latvia, nor Estonia competes with Russia for its birthright. Because the "Russian people" (Rus'kii, to be more precise) are Ukrainians, not Russians. And so either Ukraine or Russia must disappear.
Arestovich uses the following arguments:
1) In the Treaty of Hadiach, concluded in 1658 between the Rzeczpospolita and the Cossack Hetmanate, it is precisely the Ukrainian people that is meant by the word "Russian," while the agreement provided for the accession of the Hetmanate into the Rzeczpospolita as the "Grand Principality of Rus,'" a third equal to the bilateral union of Poland and Lithuania.
2) Yarema Vyshnevetsky had the title "Russian (Rus'kii) Voivod," while Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was "Russian (Rus'kii) Hetman."
3) Ukrainians were key in building the Russian Empire: for example, Chancellor Alexander Bezborodko, who actually conducted the Russian Empire's foreign policy for some time; Alexei Razumovsky, the lover of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna; the commander Ivan Paskevich; and key figures in the Soviet leadership.
Putin's narrative, confirmed by Russian training manuals and the testimony of Russian prisoners of war, is "there are no Ukrainians." Meanwhile, Kyiv could say the same thing about Russians. One of the key problems for Russia since it proclaimed itself an empire has been Ukraine. Kyiv and Moscow have a complex, codependent relationship, as they were part of a single state for centuries, for most of which time Russia tried to suppress the national self-identity of Ukraine. Now, in the view of Arestovich, we are seeing another attempt, one that is completely insane. While pursuing an anti-imperial policy and setting up the "Russian world" everywhere, Putin was not able to come up with anything better than annex Ukrainian lands to Muscovy and assimilate them. Thus, Ukrainians must either forget who they are or disappear.
Summing up, Feofan Prokopovich's grandiose historical deception continues to make both Ukrainians and Russians believe in pseudo-historical nonsense. In addition, Arestovich claims that Russia, if it does not become an empire, will not be able to continue to exist in its current form. Still, it is hard to say what the optimal basis for that would be. If it is a national Russian (Russkii) project, what should the non-Russian subjects of the federation do? And if, for example, the idea of a great Orthodox state is the basis, what should the 29 million Russian Muslims do?