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According to state opinion polls, the majority of Russians support the war in Ukraine. But can they be trusted?
A. Bessudnov, Research of opinion polls (war in Ukraine). 2022.
Autotranslation
Autotranslation
According to the results of opinion polls conducted by VTSIOM and FOM, more than 60% of Russians support a "special military operation" in Ukraine. But it is necessary to interpret these data carefully: according to the same polls in Russia, millions of people oppose the war, and among young residents of large cities who rarely watch TV and receive information mainly from the Internet, there are generally a majority of such people. Especially for Medusa, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Sociology at the University of Exeter (England) Alexey Bessudnov analyzed in detail the results of the VTSIOM survey.
Graph 1. The results of "state" opinion polls are almost the same. But it does not follow from them that the Russians support the war.
After the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, two sociological companies — VTSIOM and FOM — conducted surveys and asked respondents about their attitude to these events. The results show that about 65% of Russians are more likely to support a "special military operation" in Ukraine. But can these numbers be trusted? After all, VTSIOM and FOM are controlled by the Russian state (the first belongs to the state, the main customer of the second is the presidential administration).
There is no reason to believe that "state" sociologists directly falsify the results: approximately the same values were obtained during a telephone survey conducted from February 28 to March 1 by a group of independent sociologists.
However, there are other factors that can greatly influence the results of any survey, and they must be taken into account when interpreting. First of all it is:
However, there are other factors that can greatly influence the results of any survey, and they must be taken into account when interpreting. First of all it is:
- The wording of the questions. VTsIOM and FOM asked respondents about their attitude to the "special military operation". If a different wording had been used ("troops entering Ukraine", "military actions", "war"), the results could have changed.
- The polls were conducted last week, from Friday, February 25, to Sunday, February 27. Since then, the mood may have changed.
- Finally, it is known that not all people openly answer such questions and often say what they think they want to hear from them. Thus, most likely, the level of support for a military invasion of Ukraine in these polls is overstated.
Graph 2. Young people are less likely to support military actions.
The main socio-demographic characteristic that determines the attitude to military operations in Ukraine is age. Among people over 70, nine out of ten are more likely to support a "special military operation." Among those under 30, about half are opposed, and of the remaining "found it difficult to answer".
Vladimir Putin himself turns 70 this year, most of the members of the Security Council, which approved the recognition of the self—proclaimed republics of Donbass, are his coevals. Of those who are currently fighting in Ukraine, many are under 30.
The main socio-demographic characteristic that determines the attitude to military operations in Ukraine is age. Among people over 70, nine out of ten are more likely to support a "special military operation." Among those under 30, about half are opposed, and of the remaining "found it difficult to answer".
Vladimir Putin himself turns 70 this year, most of the members of the Security Council, which approved the recognition of the self—proclaimed republics of Donbass, are his coevals. Of those who are currently fighting in Ukraine, many are under 30.
Graph 3. Support for the "military operation" is lower among women than among men.
The gender of the respondents is another attribute on which the answers depend. Women are more likely than men to say that they do not support the "military operation", or find it difficult to answer. This difference is especially noticeable in middle age (from 30 to 50 years).
The gender of the respondents is another attribute on which the answers depend. Women are more likely than men to say that they do not support the "military operation", or find it difficult to answer. This difference is especially noticeable in middle age (from 30 to 50 years).
Graph 4. The audience of Russian television — they are for the "military operation".
It is hardly surprising that support for the "military operation" is significantly higher among those who watch TV daily. But the effect here is apparently two-sided: not only television is engaged in propaganda and agitation, but also those who agree in advance with the content of socio-political programs watch it more often.
Here again, a strong age difference is noticeable. Among those over the age of 45, and especially among pensioners, the majority watch TV every day. Almost no one does this among young people.
It is hardly surprising that support for the "military operation" is significantly higher among those who watch TV daily. But the effect here is apparently two-sided: not only television is engaged in propaganda and agitation, but also those who agree in advance with the content of socio-political programs watch it more often.
Here again, a strong age difference is noticeable. Among those over the age of 45, and especially among pensioners, the majority watch TV every day. Almost no one does this among young people.
Graf 5. Anti-war opinion is stronger in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Finally, there is a difference in the support of military operations between Moscow, St. Petersburg (as well as other major cities) and small towns and villages. In big cities, there are more people opposed to the war (especially among the young). But the differences between people with higher education and without it are less significant and noticeable only in large cities.
Finally, there is a difference in the support of military operations between Moscow, St. Petersburg (as well as other major cities) and small towns and villages. In big cities, there are more people opposed to the war (especially among the young). But the differences between people with higher education and without it are less significant and noticeable only in large cities.
You can read the full article in Russian here: https://meduza.io/feature/2022/03/05/esli-verit-gosudarstvennym-sotsoprosam-bolshinstvo-rossiyan-podderzhivayut-voynu-v-ukraine-no-mozhno-li-im-verit