Evgenii Zhirnov, "He can count on the support of the USSR." Negotiations Behind the Soviet Xinjiang Project. 2015.
"He can count on the support of the USSR"

In 1921, the Turkestan bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) proposed to Sovietize Chinese Xinjiang and create two Soviet republics on its territory - Dzungaria and Kashgaria. But the idea was not supported in Moscow. The chances of success were slim, since the White Guard units that had retreated there had accumulated in Xinjiang and had not lost their combat capability. And as a result, a serious complication of relations with Great Britain and China would inevitably arise. But, as soon as the USSR needed cattle and cotton from Xinjiang, and most importantly, the tin mined there, the idea arose of the need to establish control over the adjacent territory. And when in 1933, with the help of the White Guards, the Chinese general Sheng Shitsai seized power in the province, Moscow decided to first make him theirs.

"Strengthen Our Trading Operations"

A new stage in establishing control over Xinjiang began quite usually. In 1931, another uprising of the Muslim population against the Chinese authorities broke out, which the central government of China, fragmented and mired in civil strife, was unable to suppress. As usual, the government of the USSR was asked for help in suppressing the rebellion.

However, the introduction of Red Army units into Xinjiang would bring nothing but trouble. Soviet leaders constantly insisted that the USSR supported the national liberation movements. So the anti-Soviet propaganda would have used the participation in the suppression of one of them in full force. At the same time, the economic benefits from such military assistance to China looked very, very illusory.

Therefore, having weighed everything, Moscow decided not to rush to the introduction of troops, but to rely on Sheng Shitsai. He came to Xinjiang in the fall of 1930 and took up the modest positions of an oversight officer and instructor at a military academy. But soon after the start of the uprising, he managed to create the most combat-ready detachment of Chinese troops in the province, which was joined by the White Guard detachments. In July 1931, he became the commander-in-chief of the troops in Xinjiang. And in August 1932 he wrote to Moscow, Stalin and the Comintern, letters that he was a Marxist and was ready to serve the cause of communism.

Therefore, when on April 12, 1933, in the provincial capital of Urumqi, there was a military coup carried out by Sheng Shitsai with the help of the White Guards loyal to him, there was no negative reaction from the capital of the USSR. As it was not even after the general declared himself a duban - the governor of Xinjiang, and ordered the coup to be called the April revolution. The head of the Chinese government, Chiang Kai-shek, had no choice but to confirm him in his new position.

For the USSR, the situation was developing as well as possible. The new governor did not have full power - the governments of the rebellious regions acted simultaneously with the provincial government. So without Soviet support, he could not establish control over Xinjiang. And the Soviet leadership, providing him with metered assistance, could keep him under control and have full control over the province, which formally remained Chinese.

August 3, 1933 the Politburo of the CPSU (b) adopted a directive on working in Xinjiang - a program of action for Xinjiang proposed by a commission headed by the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov. The main points of this document were:

"1. To consider it unacceptable to support the slogans and policies of Xin-Jiang's separation from China.

2. To consider it useful to maintain friendly relations with the Urumqi government, bearing in mind the preservation of the provincial autonomy enjoyed by Xin Jiang; improving the methods of the Chinese administration in Xin Jiang: and in particular, the implementation of the reform program aimed at administrative decentralization and regional self-government of the nationalities inhabiting Xin Jiang, which was declared by the Urumqi government in order to reach an agreement with the leadership of the rebel movement (local government, equality of nationalities, freedom of speech, press, unions, election, etc.) ".

Regarding military assistance to Sheng Shitsai, the directives stated:

"It is also possible to consider it possible to provide support to the Urumqi government, if requested, in the fight against Ma-Jun-Ying and other Dungan detachments, which represent a real basis for plans to turn Xin-Jiang into a springboard for anti-Soviet activities."

However, at the same time, Soviet representatives were supposed to patronize the Muslim rebels, but, however, not all:

"To consider it inexpedient at this time and in the given conditions to support movements in the regions aimed at complete separation from the Urumqi government, while occupying a favorable position in organizing wider local self-government in those regions where there is no reason to expect the success of the activities of British or Japanese agents." ...

The Politburo ordered special attention to be paid to the White Guards:

"Given the role that detachments A, B and P play in the Xin-Jiang army, which are actually the main real armed force, it is imperative to carry out such measures that would increase our influence and control over their activities."

In addition, it was proposed to immediately start obtaining raw materials from Xinjiang:

"Consider it necessary to continue and strengthen our trade operations with Xin Jiang, meaning to establish a close economic relationship between Xin Jiang and the Soviet Union now, seeking the adoption by both the Urumqi government and regional national governments of the necessary measures to create conditions for normal trade operations and the protection of our warehouses. "

Soviet special services were instructed to closely monitor the enemy's plans for Xinjiang. And from the Soviet trade, financial and economic organizations they demanded to establish normal relations with the Xinjiang merchants and officials.

The mistakes of the past were taken into account not only in the development of a political line. One of the most important measures in the directives on economic issues was the construction of highways for the export of raw materials from Xinjiang and the delivery of Soviet goods there.

"Made a depressing impression"

The Soviet leadership quite accurately fulfilled its obligations. To help Sheng Shitsai, units of border troops, disguised as White Guards, were transferred, which, together with the Xinjiang White Guards, made up the Altai Volunteer Army, which defeated the troops of the Dungan generals. The operation, as calculated in the Main Directorate of the Border Guard, cost 17.35 million rubles. Another 2.5 million were allocated by the Politburo for awards to distinguished border guards.

Obligations were fulfilled in everything else. They brought grain from the USSR to Xinjiang, organized medical care for the population, helped with textbooks for schools and listened carefully to all the requests and wishes of members of the provincial government.

True, at the same time, Chinese communists trained in the USSR were sent from Moscow to be appointed to responsible posts in the Xinjiang administration. And this, presumably, greatly disturbed Sheng Shicai. He understood that he could be replaced at any time by another, more loyal or compliant, Chinese general or official. Therefore, he decided to become holier than the Pope. He organized a red corner on the Soviet model and began talking with Soviet representatives that he dreamed of annexing Xinjiang to the USSR. Learning of this, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and February 26, 1934 wrote to the consul of the USSR in Urumqi Mr. A. Apresova:

"We consider your telegram about Shen's red corner and talk about the possibility of Sovietization of Xinjiang alarming. Explain to the Duban that:

First, the USSR stands firmly and unshakably on the point of view of China's integrity and has no territorial claims, either direct or indirect, against China.

Second - We support and intend to support Shen only because we consider the territorial integrity of China expedient and desirable not only from the point of view of China, but also from the point of view of the USSR.

Thirdly, the USSR is one of the few, if not the only country that supports and will support China in its struggle for independence against all and every machinations of the Japanese, British and other imperialist states, and while Shen will fight against Japanese and other foreign imperialist agents like Manchzhuin, he can count on the support of the USSR. "

But Sheng Shicai's dubbing did not stop. On April 1, 1934, he wrote to Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov an extensive letter outlining his political views, which said:

"1. In August 1932, I sent letters to the Comintern and Mr. Stalin, in which I briefly stated my worldview.

2. I hereby consider it my duty to express my deep gratitude for the great help you have rendered in calming down the SC and eliminating the bandit Ma Chu Ying.

3. Despite the fact that I am not yet a member of the Communist Party, I studied Marxism, and my belief in the triumph of communism was the result of studying historical materialism, Capital, Communist Manifesto and Criticism of the Gotha Program, which gives me the opportunity do not place yourself in the ranks of blind imitators or compromisers ...

My belief in the triumph of the ideas of communism and my firm decision to fight to destroy capitalism and imperialism are my firmly established, deeply thought out worldview. The young generation of our century is charged with immense tasks. We have these tasks because the great teacher and revolutionary - Marx - armed us with a real, correct, philosophically scientifically grounded theory and the richest knowledge.

In 1917, the leaders of the revolution, Lenin, Stalin, and others, armed with the philosophical and scientific revolutionary theory of Marxism, overthrew one of the most basic strongholds of world imperialism and began organizing a new socialist society, creating the Soviet government. By this fact, my faith in the triumph of communism was further strengthened in its correctness.

4. Being a real follower of the teachings of communism, wishing to radically destroy the current system of (government) in China, provide assistance and support to the Chinese Soviet Government in Jiangxi and begin building a new state based on the principles of communism, which, together with the Soviet government, would act as a single front in the fight for the world revolution, - I express my sincere desire to carry out my further work on the management of the SC-Nom under the leadership of the Comintern.

5. Despite the fact that I am an official appointed by the Nanjing Government, I not only do not intend to support this government, but, on the contrary, will do my best to overthrow it, because the Nanjing Government capitulated to British and Japanese imperialism, without any resistance transferred to Japan my beloved homeland - Manchuria. "

Duban asked to be admitted to the Communist Party:

"I am a staunch follower of communism and hope to become a member of the Communist Party. I have no desire for fame, no militaristic inclinations, no desire to become a hero, and no desire for wealth. I am not a compromiser or a bureaucrat."

Throughout the long loyal letter, Sheng Shicai revealed his true intentions only once:

"In the implementation of communism in the SC, not the latter should nominally continue to be under the control of Nanking, in fact, a Communist Party is organized in Urumqi, which hastily groups around itself and educates its members."

He wanted to sit on two chairs at once. In response, Stalin wrote to Apresov:

"Shen-Shi-Tsai's letter made a depressing impression on our comrades ... We are sending Shen the appropriate answer ... You must explain to Shen the meaning of our answer and take steps to ensure that the instructions given in our reply are accepted by the leadership. I warn you that if our instructions are not taken into account, we will be forced to refuse to help Chenue. "

Trying to soften the impression, Apresov wrote to Moscow that Duban was a suspicious and suspicious person. You can trust him, but you must not lose your vigilance. The Consul emphasized that another aspect of the case is much more important:

"Whatever we do for Xin-Jiang is justified by its importance for us, for Xin-Jiang, in addition to its main political and strategic importance, is a richest region and can become a raw material and meat base for us. Development of inexhaustible fabulous riches promises Xin-Jiang a richest prospect In case of need, with coal and oil from Xin-Jiang, we could cover the needs of not only Turksib, but also the Central Asian republics and Western Siberia. 26 regions are known in Xin-Jiang where there is gold. Development of tin, radium and other valuable and rare the required ores will be returned by the investments that we have planned, and will justify the assistance that we provide to the Xin-Jiang government. "

"One more brother, one less brother"

That is why, when another uprising began in 1937, Soviet troops again helped Sheng Shitsai to maintain his power. And in 1938, Duban, who had secretly arrived in Moscow, was received as the most dear guest. Sheng Shitsai told Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov about business, gold mining and problems with the start of oil production. And then Duban returned to the seemingly closed topic. The recording of the conversation stated:

"T. Molotov asked if Duban had any questions, Duban replied that if they had time, then he had one question for Comrade Stalin personally. He was told that they always have time for business. Duban said that his long-standing dream was to join the party, that he had repeatedly addressed this request to Apresov ... Currently, he received such a happy opportunity - to personally talk with the leader of the world proletariat, Comrade Stalin, and therefore decided to use this opportunity for and if Comrade Stalin finds it possible to accept him into the ranks of the Party, he will be very happy.

Comrade Stalin replied that if Duban insists on this very much, then he does not object, however, Comrade Voroshilov protested, saying that this could damage the work of Duban, since both Chiang Kai Shi and Ambassador Yang, upon learning about this, would be very unhappy. Duban replied that it would have to be kept secret, and neither the first nor the second would know about it. T. Stalin objected to this, stating that such a fact would be very difficult to keep secret, because he would have to be attached to some organization, and therefore, it would become known to several people, Comrade Voroshilov added that any party member could cease to be as such or go to another party, and then this secret may become known to strangers. Comrade Stalin asked whether Chiang Kai Shek would think that the club was intimidated and forced to join the party by force. Duban objected to this, stating that Chiang Kai Shi would not know about it, and again began to insist on his request. Then, after consulting with Comrade. Comrade Molotov and Voroshilov, Comrade Stalin replied that in principle they do not object, and if Duban insists, they agree. "

Along the way, Sheng Shitsai, who received an invitation to dinner with the Soviet leaders, resolved another personal question:

"During a conversation between Comrade Stalin and the secretary who came in, Duban asked Comrade Voroshilov to arrange for his brother (a patient) to go to a school in Moscow, or to a motorcycle mechanic school, or to an artillery school, Comrade Voroshilov asked if he knew Russian language, and having learned that he did not know the Russian language, he said that it would be very difficult to do it, but he promised to do everything possible, saying that one brother more, one less brother - does not matter. "

If Voroshilov knew how wrong he was! After the beginning of the repressions in the USSR, which were carried out in Xinjiang, Sheng Shitsai was terrified of becoming their next victim. And therefore, as some of his enemies asserted, he began to search for contacts with the Japanese. At the same time, he never ceased to emphasize his loyalty to Stalin and the USSR. For example, in January 1941, he again proposed making Xinjiang a Soviet republic and incorporating it into the USSR. He wrote to the Soviet leaders that the most favorable moment had come for this: England was engaged in a war in Europe, and Chiang Kai-shek was in a war with the Japanese. He knew that the USSR at that moment would not take such a step so as not to be accused of stabbing China in the back, and understood that he would be refused again.

But after the first defeats of the Red Army in the summer of 1941, the attitude of Duban to Soviet friends changed significantly. Arrests of pro-Soviet officials and residents of Xinjiang began. And in March 1942, Sheng Shitsai reported unpleasant news to Moscow about his brother, who had returned from the USSR:

"On the 19th of March of this year, at 7 pm, the commander of the Mechanized Brigade of Xinjiang Shen-Shi-Chi (N. Petrov), sitting in his mother's room, talked with his brother Shen-shi-di. At about 8 o'clock they 6-7 minutes later, the wife of the commander of the Shen-shih-chi Brigade, Chen-hsiu-ying, ran from her room to her mother and said that Shen had fired a revolver by mistake. Shen could not utter a single word. The Chief of the Sanitary Department of the Dubanya Headquarters Hu-zhu-bi and senior instructor Lepin were urgently called in to provide an ambulance. on the forehead above the eyebrow. The bullet lodged in the ceiling. After examination, Shen was taken to the hospital, where he died soon after.

The investigation established that at the time of the incident there were four people in Shen-shih-chi's room along with Shen. Two of them were Shen's children: a son and a daughter. The son is 4 years old, he was sick on the bed, the daughter is 6 years old. Children, of course, do not know how to shoot. After returning from the Soviet Union, Shen-shih-chi himself, having been appointed commander of the Mechanized Brigade, was in high spirits all the time. There is absolutely no reason: to assume suicide. An accidental shot can injure oneself in the lower parts of the body or other persons, but not oneself in the head - so this is out of the question. The bullet inlet is on the right behind the pinna, so it can't be an accidental shot from yourself. From this it is clear that talking about an accidental shot is implausible. In addition to the above persons, only Shen-shih-chi's wife, Chen-syu-in, was in the room. The investigation established that nowhere on the doors and windows of this room was there a trace of the arrival of an outside bullet. This suggests that Shen-shi-chi was killed by Chen-syu-in. There is no doubt about that.

Based on the results of the investigation, on March 21, Chen-syu-ying was arrested. During the investigation, Chen-syu-in confessed that she had killed Shen-shih-chi. "

According to Duban, his brother was the victim of a conspiracy organized by Soviet advisers and their Xinjiang accomplices. They decided to kill the governor's brother in order to then kill him and take power in the province into their own hands:

"In the materials sent and in the letter, unheard of and completely unsubstantiated accusations are raised against the Consul General of the USSR in Urumqi, Bakulin, the chief military adviser to General Ratov, as well as against other Soviet workers named in the letter in Xinjiang. All these accusations are based on some provocative rumors, and it is clear to the Soviet Government that you, Mr. Duban, have been captured by these rumors. Duban. At the same time, they claim that you organized the assassination of Shen Shih-chi, considering the latter your rival in the management of Xinjiang. However, the Soviet Government does not so easily give in to rumors. "

Relations with Stalin and the USSR, as Sheng Shitsai had hoped, were hopelessly ruined. However, he did not manage to establish full-fledged contacts with Chiang Kai-shek. The head of the Chinese government remembered that in 1936, when he was captured by one of the Chinese generals, the Xinjiang duban offered Urumqi as a place of detention for a high-ranking prisoner. Sheng Shicai tried to flirt with the Americans, and in order to gain favor with the enemies of the Chinese communists, he executed Mao Zedong's brother, Mao Zemin. Then he arrested their opponents, the Kuomintang. He also tried to restore good relations with the USSR.

But in 1944 he had to accept Chiang Kai-shek's offer and leave Xinjiang, saving his life, accumulated wealth and getting a post in the government.

The project that could be called "our man in Xinjiang" has failed. And the Soviet leadership had to start everything from the very beginning - to raise an uprising of Muslims, to form an independent state - East Turkestan. And then watch as the leaders of China, which has become socialist, with inhuman stubbornness, regain power over this territory.



Sheng Shicai, 1895—1970